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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
THE INVASION OF CAMBODIA
"'My people have no food, no medicine,
and we are being killed,' he said, getting angrier
as he went on. 'What does the United Nations
mean? Why don't they do something?' ""
On April 17, 1975, the bombing finally stopped. 2 The people
of Phnom Penh listened to the silence and rejoiced. They were tired
of war's misery and, although they did not support the Khmer
Rouge, 3 they enthusiastically -reeted these victors who brought
with them the illusion of peace as they marched into the city.
This enthusiasm was short-lived, followed by suffering of such
intensity that it shocked the world.
The blueprint of the Khmer Rouge called for the radical remolding of Cambodian society. 4 The Khmer Rouge had "resolved
to annul the past and obliterate the present... [in order] to fashion
1.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1979, at AI, col. 6.
2.
N. Sihanouk, War & Hope: The Case for Cambodia 37 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Sihanouk].
The Far East and Australasia 599
A Marxist insurgent group.
3.

(1979-80) [hereinafter cited as Australasia].
4.
K. Quinn, The Khmer Krahom Program to Create a Communist
Society in Southern Cambodia (State Dept. study of the Khmer Rouge), U.S.
Consulate Can Tho, Vietnam, Airgram, Feb. 20, 1974. This paper was declassified in 1976. It was revised by Quinn as Political Change in Wartime:
The Khmer Krahom Revolution in Southern Cambodia 1970-74, Naval War
College Review (Spring, 1976), cited in W. Shawcross, Sideshow, 321, 428-29

n. (1979) [hereinafter cited as Sideshow].
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a future uncontaminated by the influence of either." 5 The first
phase of their program called for emptying the cities of their in-,
not march
habitants. No exceptions were made. Those who could
6
were either shot or left to die on the side of the road.
Without supplies or food, the people were forced to build
villages and plant rice. Because there were no animals or farm
implements, they had to dig and build with their hands. 7 After
a working day that lasted from early morning until dusk, the people8
had to spend several hours in political indoctrination classes.
Additionally, if there was adequate light, they were forced to work
till the early morning hours. They ate anything they could find,
even the leaves and bark of trees.
Death came often and with terrifying barbarousness. It inexorably pursued those most despised by the Khmer Rouge: the
educated; those tainted by association with the Vietnamese, the
Lon Nol government, or the United States; prostitutes; and the
handicapped. 9 Entire families often were executed for the crimes
of a single member. 10 Death awaited those who complained about
1 1 boys and girls caught holding hands, 1 2
their living conditions,
and others engaged in similar "crimes." Children were taken from
their families and brainwashed by the Khmer Rouge before being
sent back as spies. 1 31 4 It was difficult not to agree that "Cambodia
[was] hell on earth."
It is within the context of these events that the questions
addressed by this note are raised: first, what are the obligations
of the United Nations, if any, to aid or intervene when faced with
a situation where the rulers of a state are, in essence, practicing
genocide on that state's citizens; second, under international law,
may another nation-state (in this case Vietnam) intervene in such
a situation on its own so as to stop such atrocities.
In order adequately to address these questions in the context

5.

Id. at 321.

6.
J. Barron and A. Paul, Murder of a Gentle Land 83 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Barron].

7.

Id. at 152.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Sideshow, supra note 4, at 321.
Id. at 368-69.
Barron, supra note 6,at 83, 144.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 136.
Id.at 137.
Sideshow,supra note 4,at 389.

1980]

Invasion of Cambodia

of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, it is necessary to examine
the geography and history of the country as well as the specific
events which led to the Vietnamese intervention.
Cambodia is bounded on the north by Laos and Thailand,
on the west by Thailand, on the cast by Vietnam, and on the
south by the Gulf of Thailand. It has an area of 69,898 square
miles 15 (about the size of Missouri) 1 6 and is divided into seventeen
provinces. As of 1976, the country had a population of nearly eight
18
million people 1 7 which included Vietnamese, Chinese, Chams, 19
Europeans and various groups of hilimen known as Khmer-Locu.
Before 1970, ninety percent of the people lived in villages built
around Buddhist temples, 2 0 most of which were within the fertile
central plains. 2 1 The population of the capital, Phnom Pcnh, has
fluctuated widely over the last fifteen years. In 1975, it was approximately three million, 2 2 up from four hundred fifty thousand in
1968.23 After the forced flight from the cities, the population
Penh has a
dropped to a mere twenty thousand.2 4 Today, Phnom
25
population of about three hundred thousand people.
Cambodia was created at the beginning of the Christian era
with the civilization of the Angkor.2 6 In the course of fashioning
a sophisticated hydraulic civilization, Angkor developed a strong
economic base from which it was able to subjugate vast areas of
Southeast Asia. 2 7 During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,

15. Australasia, supra note 3, at 596.
16. Sideshow, supra note 4, at 37.
17. [1979-801 The Statesman's Yearbook 753 (1979). This was an,
increase from a population of 6.8 million people in 1970. [1977-781 The
Statesman's Yearbook 1111 (1977).
18. The Chams are Moslems descended from the people of the ancient
kingdom of Champa. The Hammond Almanac of a Million Facts Records
Forecasts 540 (1980).
19. [1979-801 The Statesman's Yearbook 753 (1979).
20. Sideshow, supra note 4, at 36.
21. Id. at 37.
22. Id. at 183.
23. Australasia, supra note 3, at 596.
.24. Id.
25. N.Y. Times, April 29, 1980, at A7, col. 1.
26. Sideshow, supra note 4, at 39.
27. Id.
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28
howCambodia struggled to maintaii its diminishing (lominance;

ever, constant attacks by the Thais and the Vietnamese, beginning
ill the Iilteeith century, re(Iuccd Cambodia to a "vassal of Siatr"
(Thailand). 2 9 Cambodia was saved Irom oblivion by the establishncnt ol' it French protectoratt 3 0 in 1864.31
France sought to
use Camnbodia its an aid to the French economy and to counter
the British position in 'l'hailanid, where the latter had strong trading
interests. 3 2
'he Cambodians rebelled against the French misuse
of' their country, and in 1949 Cambodia was granted indcpendence
as an Associate State of' the Frentch tnion. 3 3 In January, 1955,

through the Genevt Agreements on Indochina of1 1954, Cambodia
became financially and economically independent, both of France
and of the other two Associate States o0) French Indo-China, Vietnam and Laos. 3 4 Cambodia "pledged itself to a 1'rcc and open
political process to be demonstrated through elections to be collductcd under the terms of the 1947 conslitutiol." 3
'This severely
limited the monarchy's role in Cambodian politics.3 6 It was for this
reason that King Norodom Sihanouk
abdicated his throne in I'avor
37
of his father Norodom Sumarit.
Sihanouk I'orncd a political movement, the Sangkun

Rcastr

(Popular Socialist Community), an organizatiom distinguished less

28.
ld. at 40-41.
29. Id., (citing David Chandler, "Cambodia before the French: Politics
in a Tributary Kingdom 1794-1848," (1973) (dissertation, University of
Michigan)).
30. /d. at 42.
31. Id. at 43. But sec [1979-801 'he Statesman's Yearbook 752
(1980), which recorded this event as occurring in 1863.
32. Sideshow, supra note 4, at 43. "it was not long before the King [of
Cambodial realized that the interests of the Frcnch resident differed little from
those of his Siamese predecessor ....
[TI he Irench tended to push the Vietnamcse borders northward and westward at the expense of Cambodia. Constant
minor changes in the. frontier took place; maps were always out of date, or
ambiguously drawn, or both. Such alterations remain a source of bitterness
and warfare." /d.
33. [ 1979-801 The Statesman's yearbook 750 (1979).
34. Id.
35.
Australasia, supra note 3, at 598-99.
36. Id. at 599.
37.
In 1955 Sihanouk left the throne in order to become Prime Minister.
II. Kissinger, White Ilouse Years 457 (1979) [hereinafter cited as KissingerI .
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for its ideology than for the number of different cliques and strains
of political thought it embraced.3 8 In 1955, 1958, 1962, and 1966,
the Sangkum won every seat in the National Assembly,3 9 and in
June, 1960, after his father's death, Sihanouk was elevated to chief
of state by a unanimous vote of the Cambodian National
Assembly. 4 °
From his assumption of power until his overthrow, Sihanouk
played one group against another in order to maintain Cambodia's
neutrality.
The policies he followed were predominantly antiAmerican: in 1956, he spumed American Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles' invitation to join the South East Asia Treaty Organization; in 1963, he renounced American military and economic aid
that he had been receiving since 1955, and demanded that the United
States embassy close down and that its personnel leave the countr41 in 1.965, he severed diplomatic relations with the United
States.4 2 A few years later, Sihanouk reestablished diplomatic relations with the United States after noting that the Communists were
gaining more popular approval. 43 He tacitly allowed assaults on Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) bases on the Cambodian-Vietnamese border as a means of reducing the influence of
the left.44
In early 1970, Sihanouk traveled to the U.S.S.R. and China
to seek aid and to vent his anger at North Viet Nam's abuse of
38. These groups "remained subservient to Sihanouk partly because
there was no alternative and partly because he enjoyed real popularity."
Sideshow, supra note 4, at 50.
39. Australasia, supra note 3, at 599.
40. Id. See also Kissinger, supra note 40, at 457.
41.
"Sihanouk suspected that too many of his more conservative
generals and ministers were becoming dependent upon both American aid and
American attitudes." Sideshow, supra note 4, at 60.
42. Newsweek had just published an article scorning him and
"accus[ing] his family of running the profitable Phnom Penh brothel business,"
which Sihanouk called an "intolerable intrusion." However, "a more important
reason for the break was that the first American combat troops had just splashed
ashore at Danang in South Vietnam." Sideshow, supra note 4, at 61-62.
43. F. Ponchaud, Cambodia: Year Zero 164 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Year Zero]. Sihanouk's gestures of friendliness toward the United States
included allowing Jacqueline Kennedy to visit the ruins of Angkor. She claimed
that this visit was intended "to fulfill a childhood dream." Sideshow, supra
note 4, at 68.
44. Charles Meyer, Sihanouk's long-time French aide, declares that
Sihanouk meant only to allow isolated small-scale attacks, not a vast B-52
campaign along the length of the border. Sideshow, supra note 4, at 70.
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Cambodian territory. 45
Meanwhile, Lon Nol, Cambodia's Prime
Minister, organized demonstrations in front of the North Vietnamese
and Viet Cong embassies to show the government's displeasure at the
use of the Cambodian border region as a base for attacks into South
Viet Nam. 4 6 The embassies were sacked after the demonstrators
rioted.4 7
Sihanouk, fearful that riots would upset the precarious
balance between the Americans and the Communists, angrily denounced Lon Nol and his
'lackeys," and announced that he was
48
returning to Phnom Penh.
Fearing retaliation from Sihanouk, Lon Nol, with Sirik Matak
49
Sihanouk's cousin, overthrew the former king in a bloodless coup.
Sihanouk, with China's backing, allied with the North Vietnamese
and with his enemies, the Khmer Rouge. 5 0 The Khmer Rouge had
only a few thousand followers before this union, but eventually
were able to use Sihanouk to gain international recognition as well
as support from the rural population of Cambodia. 5 1 Faced with
such opposition and backed by a "pitifully weak and ill-equipped
army, '99
Lon Nol tried to maintain neutrality by making an accommodation with the VC/NVA regarding their use of Cambodian sanctuaries as well as Sihanoukville, a port on the Gulf of Thailand
through which the VC/NVA shipped supplies for use in the Vietnam
War. 5 3 The American invasion of the Cambodian sanctuaries made

45. Kissinger, supra note 37,at 461-62.
46. Sideshow, supra note 4, at 115-16.
47. Id. at 117-18. It is unclear whether Sihanouk approved of these
rallies. Id. at 116; Kissinger, supra note 37, at 461.
48. Sideshow, supra note 4, at 118.
49. Id. at 119; Kissinger, supra note 40, at 461-62.
50. Kissinger, supra note 37, at 468; Year Zero, supra note 46, at 166.
51.
Year Zero, supra note 43, at 164. The Cambodian Communist
Party was founded in 1951. It grew out of the guerrilla forces which were
formed to fight. the Japanese and the French. When the North Vietnamese
accepted the terms of the Geneva Agreement, the Cambodian Communist
Party split politically over the issues of neutrality and integration with
Sihanouk's political structure. Members of the party who remained in Cambodia
formed a new political party, the Praecheachon Group. Sideshow, supra note 4,
at 237-38. In 1966, Sihanouk invited three members of the Praecheacon Group
to join his government, but they were eventually expelled for what Sihanouk
believed to be plots against him. Id. at 244. As a result, the leaders of the
Khmer Rouge were condemned to death in absentia. Kissinger, supra note
37, at 458.
52. Australasia, supra note 3, at 599.
53. Year Zero, supra note 43, at 164; Sideshow, supra note 4, at 123.
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any compromise impossible.5 4
Lon Nol was unable to maintain his precarious hold on the
government, 5 5 eventually losing control of the army and the government bureaucracy. 5 6 Under Lon Nol's government, millions of
Cambodians were driven into abject poverty as rubber production
stopped, rice production slowed, and prices skyrocketed. 5 7 By
the end of his rule, the people of Phnom Penh were slowly starving. The city's population had been swelled to an unhealthy level
58
by refugees fleeing areas that were controlled by the Khmer Rouge
and had been targeted for strategic bombing by the United States.
His regime finally collapsed after American aid was cut off in 1975.
The government of Democratic Kampuchea (the Khmer Rouge)
replaced the Lon Nol government: Khieu Samphan was Head of
State5 9 and Pol Pot was Prime Minister. The latter attempted
to implement the agrarian revolution formulated by Khieu Samphan
by executing a social policy that erased the concepts of the individual, religion family, love, and ownership at the expense of service
In addition, Pol Pot rejected all foreign aid and
to the Angka.
influence with the exception of that from China.6 1
Relations with Vietnam, which were cool after the Khmer
Rouge triumph in 1975, were quickly freezing. Vietnam had angered
the Khmers by refusing to remove Vietnamese troops from the
now notorious- sanctuaries; by refusing to surrender the island
of Phu Quoc; by refusing to withdraw from several of the Wai
islands, previously controlled by Cambodia; and by refusing to
54. Sideshow, supra note 4, at 126, 130.
55. Id. at 187.
56. Id. at 228-29.
57. Id. at 220-21.
58. Id. at 318-19. There were reports of Khmer Rouge perniciousness
in 1974. Allegedly, in a village near Siem Reap, the Khmer Rouge, after burning
down the village, nailed old women to the walls of their houses before they
were burned alive and tore children apart by hand. Id. at 353.
59. Australasia, supra note 3, at 600. Khieu Samphan was the architect
of the economic plans adopted by the Khmer Rouge. He stressed the need for
Cambodia to develop its agriculture fully before it industrialized. Sideshow,
supra note 4, at 240.
60. Sideshow, supra note 4, at 378. "The individual must find complete
joy in working for the Angka, must foreswear personal property, family relationships and such attitudes as pride, contempt, envy." Id.
61. China was above suspicion because it had supported the Pol Pot
faction of the Khmer Rouge over the Hanoi faction. Id. at 257, 382; Australasia, supra note 3, at 600.,
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agree to a proposed boundary change that would benefit Cambodia. 6 2 The boundary disputes led to skirmishes between the two
countries in 1976 and 197763 in which Vietnamese and Khmer
troops began raiding each other's positions along the Cambodian
border."
In April of 1977, the Vietnamese backed a coup against
Pol Pot only to see it crushed, 6 5 and the Pol Pot government massacred one thousand Vietnamese villagers in an attack. 6 6 Following
this escalation of fighting, Cambodia denounced Vietnam publicly
and broke off diplomatic relations 6 7
In January of 1978, the
69
68
with 100,000 troops.
Vietnamese launched a massive attack
The Khmers, outgunned and outmanned, fought a somewhat successful guerilla war. 7 0 In January of 1979, the Vietnamese captured
Phnom Penh 7 1 and installed the Hen
Samrin government, which
7
presently controls most of Cambodia. 2
Undoubtedly, Vietnam's decision to invade Cambodia was

based on the belief-gauging economic and military data-that
Vietnam could not lose the war. Vietnam's military strength easily
surpassed Cambodia's:
Vietnam . . . is the preeminent military power

in Southeast Asia, with a large, experienced
army equipped with the most sophisticated
weapons. . ..

Cambodia's army, on the other

hand, is estimated at only 60,000 to 80,000
soldiers, many of them teenagers, and as a former guerilla force it has limited experience in
large-scale conventional warfare.
The Cam62. Sideshow, supra note 4, at 384.
63. Id.; Australasia, supra note 3, at 600. By the end of 1977, Phnom
Penh was denouncing Hanoi publicly. Sideshow, supra note 4, at 385; Australasia, supra note 3, at 600.
64. Sideshow, supra note 4, at 384.
65. Id.
66. Time,January 16, 1978, at 22-23.
67. Sideshow, supra note 4, at 384.
68. Id. at 385.
69. U.S. News & World Report, December 18, 1978, at 33. The attack
was supported by heavy bombing. Id.
70. Sideshow, supra note 4, at 385; U.S. News & World Report, December 18, 1978, at 34. The Khmers tried to match the Vietnamese power at Snoul;
half of the Cambodian division was lost. Id.
71. Sideshow, supra note 4 at 390; Time, January 16, 1978, at 22-23.
72. Australasia, supra note 3, at 600.

1980]

Invasion of Cambodia

bodians have virtually no air force, .. . [a]
limited7 3 number of artillery guns,... and [no]
tanks.
Economically, Vietnam had a slightly higher output of goods, but
74
both countries are so poor that they belong to the "fourth world."
Vietnam had embarked upon a five-year economic program designed
to transform its predominantly agrarian society, initially, to one
75
based on light industry and, finally, to one of heavy industry.
Currently, ninety percent of the population is engaged in agriculture.
The country has large deposits of coal and large fish resources, 76 and
there have been recent discoveries of natural gas and oil. 7 7 Cambodia has instituted an economic plan similar to Vietnam's; however, it stresses agricultural self-sufficiency and does not foresee
a heavy industry stage until the distant future. 78 It has the greatest
fresh water fish resources in Southeast Asia, and, of its total area
of forty-four million acres, some of which is the most fertile in the
tropics, 9 about twenty million are cultivable. 8 0 Therefore, in view
of its economic and military predicament, Cambodia acted unwisely
when it launched raids in 1977 against Vietnam and Thailand, 8 1
and again when it rejected Vietnam's offer of reconciliation in
December of 1977.82
73. See Szulc, The War We Left Behind, New York, January 16, 1978.
at 32 [hereinafter cited as New York). However, in Southeast Asia the Cambodians are known to be valiant fighters, and during the first Indochinese war,
French officers preferred them to the Vietnamese: "In man to man fighting,
the Khmer are considered to have no masters." Year Zero, supra note 43,
at 140.
74. U.S. News & World Report, June 25, 1979, at 53. Cambodia was
listed by the Overseas Development Council as the poorest nation in the world,
with a per-capita national output of seventy dollars. Id.
75.
[1978-791 The Statesman's Yearbook 240-41 (1978).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Sideshow, supra note 4, at 240-41.
79. Id. at 38.
80. [1978-79] The Statesman's Yearbook 754 (1978).
81.
New York, supra note 73, at 30. "A broad political assessment of
this war is extremely difficult, partly because independent reporting by Western
diplomats and reporters is impossible....
However, the first conclusion of
Western government specialists is that Cambodia was the aggressor in these
attacks." Id.
82. Id. "According to diplomats, the Cambodians rejected this overture,
as they rejected a direct Vietnamese negotiating proposal ten days later." Id.
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Vietnam's decision to invade Cambodia, based as it was on
admittedly military motives, can also be described as an attempt
to alleviate the violations of human rights which were occurring
in the latter country. The situation is not one of first impression:
there were similar developments as a result of the Indian invasion
of East Pakistan during the Bangladesh civil war. 8 3 The parallels
between the India-Pakistan and the Vietnam-Cambodia conflicts
are close enough to warrant an examination of the factors which
led to the Indian invasion.
Pakistan was composed of two units: the west, dominated
by the Punjab; and the east, Bengal, separated by a thousand miles
of Indian territory, with no common language, held together by
Islam and a fear of domination by India's Hindu culture. 8 4 Elections were to be held on December 7, 1970, in East and West Pakistan as a transitional step from the military government of Yahya
Khan to a civilian government. 8 5 However, a devastating cyclone
ravaged East Pakistan, and the elections became a referendum on
Yahya's handling of the emergency. 8 6 As a result, the Awami
League, dedicated to East Pakistan's autonomy, won 167 out of the
169 seats contested in the East, giving it a majority of 313 seats
in the National Assembly. 8 7 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib),
leader of the Awami League, 8 8 demanded an end to martial law and
a return to popular rule. 8 9 Urged by' the military and Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People's Party, to prevent East
Pakistani independence, Yahya Khan, with less than forty thousand
troops, re-enforced military rule over the seventy-five million people
83. See Franck and Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force, 67 Am. J. of Int'l L. 275, 285 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Franck] ; Conference Proceedings Part II: The Present,
Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations 44 (R. Lillich, ed. 1973).
"[India's) course of action in the Bangladesh situation probably constitutes
the clearest case of forceful individual humanitarian intervention in this
century." Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention-Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter, 4 Cal. W.
Int'l LJ. 203, 224 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fonteyne).

84.

Kissinger, supra note 37, at 845.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

id. at 850.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 852.
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of East Pakistan." The order imposed by the military government
was extremely harsh-Mujib was arrested and sentenced to deathand caused9 1millions of refugees to flee to India to escape the army's

atrocities.

Admittedly overwhelmed by the eight million refugees within
her borders, 9 2 and undoubtedly concerned by suffering inflicted
on the Bengalis, India invaded East Pakistan on October 30, 1971. 9 3
Full scale war broke out a short time later. 94 On December 3, 1971,
Pakistan attacked India on the latter's western border. This battle
was short-lived as India offered an unconditional cease-fire in the
West on December 16, 1971.9- a day after a Pakistani cease-fire
96
offer was accepted by India in the East.
The Indian invasion can be viewed as a legitimate invocation
of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.97 Yet, what lay
beneath India's humanitarian facade was the desire to destroy
Pakistan. 9 8 India did not want a peaceful settlement with Pakistan.
Pakistan later made overtures for peace: it would accept a U.N.
supervision of the resettlement of the refugees 9 9 and a proposal
to have U.N. observers stationed on Pakistan's bordersI ° ° and it
would replace a martial-law administrator with an appointed civilian
governor. 0 1
Meanwhile, India trained forty thousand Bengali
guerillas poised to strike Pakistan, 10 2 and moved its many strong
troops1 o to the Pakistani border. 1 0 4 Therefore, despite the impure
90. Id.
91. Id. at 853.
92. Id. at 873.
93. Id. at 877.
94. Id. at 882.
95. Id. at 913. It is Dr. Kissinger's firm conviction that it was only
political pressure from the U.S.S.R., which had recently signed a military treaty
with India and which feared a cancellation of the scheduled summit with President Nixon in 1972, that caused India to offer a cease-fire. Id. at 913-14.
96. Id. at 913.
97. See note 83 sup=.
98. Kissinger, supra note 37, at 855,861-62,871-73,885.
99. Id. at 863.
100. Id. at 894.
101. Id. at 870.
102. d. at 875.
103. Id. at 898.
104. Id. at 856.
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motive for India's intervention, 10 5

(Vol. I!

Ihe factors were present that

revived the dormant doctrine or humnitarian intervention:106

the unspeakable nature and number or human rights violations
and the withdrawal of troops after the Bengalis had achieved
independence.
Stripped io its bare essentials, the historical factors that remain
from which to judge the validity of Vietnam's intervention on
humanitarian grounds arc substantially similar to those that existed
the invasion by a stronger
during the Indian-Pakistani conflict:

nation having tainted motives into one that is committing outrages
upon its own citizens. A most important factor, the withdrawal
of the intervenor after completion of the invasion, has not occurred
in the Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict. Whether Vietnam remains
because the Pol Pot forces are still active or because the Vietnamese
plan to exercise control over Cambodia is as yet unclear. That the

intervention has been positive in some respects cannot be doubted:
Pol Pot's complete control has been removed; there has been a return

105. "[T] he hardest problem is whether humanitarian intervention
should be permissible in a situation where the interventions, to succeed, must
alter the authority structure of the State itself.
"The Indian-Pakistan case raises this issue squarely, and for that reason it
is particularly troubling ....
The problems are harder than they appear. It
is difficult to tell the damsel from the dragon in a context in which one side
engages in widespread murder of civilians and the other side-for various political
as well as humanitarian reasons-intervenes and in so doing dismembers a historical rival." Conference Proceedings Part I1: The Present, Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations 50 (R. Lillich ed. 1973) (remarks of Prof. John
Moore) (emphasis supplied).
106. But see Franck, supra note 83, at 276 citing UN Doc. S/PV 1606,
Dec. 4, 1971, at 86. The Indian ambassador, in his address to the United
Nations after the East Pakistan invasion declared: "we have on this particular
occasion absolutely nothing but the purest of motives and the purest of intentions: to rescue the people of East Bengal from what they are suffering."
Professor Richard Lillich believes that the months of world and United Nations
inactivity "in the face of obvious gross human rights deprivations ... manifestly
calls for a fundamental re-evaluation of the protection of human rights by
general international law. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention . . . deserves the most searching reassessment given the failure of the United Nations
to ... alleviate the mass suffering which took place in ... Bangladesh." Franck,
supra note 83, at 277 citing The InternationalProtection of Human Rights by
General International Law, Second Interim Report of the Sub-Committee
(Richard Lillich, Rapporteur), in Report of the International Committee on
Human Rights of the International Law Assn. 38 at 54 (1972).
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to the cities;
and Cambodians have beers allowed to organize their
10 7
villages.
Thus, the factors were present in both actions which allowed
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention to be used as a justification. Humanitarian intervention "should be seen as a... gratuitous
act to prevent the continuation of genocidal activities or policies
of foreign governments against minorities which are their own
(and not the intervening States') nationals." 1 0 8 It is "based on
the kinship and minimum reciprocal responsibility of all humanity,
the inability of geographical boundaries to stem the categorical
moral imperatives, and ultimately, the confirmation of the sanctity
of human life, without reference to place or transient circumstances." 0 9 Most important, it is the only international mechanism
which offers prospective victims of atrocities hope that their lives,
let alone their human rights, will be protected.
The concept of humanitarian interveition has been recognized
since the times of Grotius and Vattel. 1 1 0 However, the first invocation of the concept did not come until the Greek intervention of
1829.111 Many times during the 1820's, the Porte1 12 massacred
the Greeks, and these atrocities led France, Great Britain, and Russia
to conclude the Treaty of London of July 6, 1827,113 in which they
agreed to put an end to the bloodshed in Greece and to propose
a limited local autonomy for the region. After the Turkish government rejected the proposal, these major 9owers, by military means,
forced the Porte to accept the proposal.I.
It has been stated that

107. U.S. News and World Report, August 27, 1979, at 34. See Year
Zero, supra note 43 at 105. Additional support was suggested by the comments
of Representative Elizabeth Holtzman during her visit to Cambodia in November
1979: it was "noted... that she gained a sense of revival, with people returning, students in school and children being tenderly and lovingly cared for in the
orphanage [she] visited." N.Y. Times, November 13, 1979, at A3, col. 2.
108. Conference Procedure Part 3: The Present, Humanitarian intervention and the United Nations 46 n.2 (R. Lillich ed., 1973).
109. Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, privately
circulated in 1968, reprinted in Conference Proceedings Part 3: The Present,
Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations 168 (R. LMlich ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Reisman].
110. Fonteyne,supra note 83,at 214.
111. Id. at 207.
112. The Turkish government.
113. Reisman, supra note 109, at 179.
114. Fonteyne, supra note 83, at 207.
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the vast majority of scholars have appraised this intervention as a
lawful action, based as it was on exigent humanitarian
115
considerations.
Apart from its history as a method of ending bloodshed, the
doctrine is also important as an analogue for other invasions 1 of
16
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries-the Syrian invasion,
the invasion of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria, 1 1 7 the Macedonian invasion, 1 18 and the American invasion of Cuba1 19 -in
terms of who intervened where, why, and for how long. The essential pattern was that a major Western power invaded a nation substantially weaker militarily and economically in order to prevent
gross violations of human rights of a relatively helpless group by
that nation's government, and remained until it was reasonably
was then
satisfied that the atrocities would not recur. Such action
12 0
legal because it was in conformity with international law.
With the passage of the U.N. Charter, major assaults have
been launched against the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.
Opponents of the doctrine contend that its spirit has been supplanted by the passage of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which,
with the exception of self-defense, forbids the use of force by one
state against another. Article 2(4) reads:
All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence
with
of any state, or in any manner inconsistent
12 1
the Purposes of the United Nations.
Even though such an interpretation is reasonable, other arguments can be offered. The objections to humanitarian intervention
can be overcome by an examination of the language of Article 2(4).
The article does not bar force per se, but instead bars the use of force
115. Reisman,supra note 109, at 180.
116. See generally Fonteyne, supra note 83, at 208-09; Reisman, supra
note 109, at 180-81.
117. See Fonteyene, supra note 83, at 212; Note, The Law of Unilateral
Humanitarian Intervention by Armed Force: A Legal Survey, 79 Mil. L. Rev.
158, 162 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Armed Force].
118. See Fonteyene,supra note 83,at 213.
119. See Franck, supra note 83, at 285.
120. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700-01 (1900); Armed Force,
supra note 117, at 169-71.
121. U.N. Charter, Art. 2, para. 4.
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"against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations." 1 2 2 The concern of humanitarian intervention, however,
is not with violating the "territorial integrity" of. a nation but with
gross violations of human rights, a purpose that is high among
"the expectations and demands of the peoples of the world." 1 23
"The preamble and the critical first Article of the Charter,
framed in the awful shadow of the atrocities of war, left no doubt
[about the existence] of the intimate nexus that the framers perceived to link international peace and security and the most fundamental rights of all individuals. " 1 24 The U.N.'s concern with human
rights is further evidenced by the formation of the Commission on
Human Rights by the Economic and Social Council 125 the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,124 the Genocide
Convention 127 and the International Covenants on Civil12and
Politi9
cal Rightsl8 and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.
122. Id.
123. Reisman, supra note 109, at 170.
124. Id. at 171.
125. U.N. Charter, Art. 62, para. 2.
126. G.A. Res. 217 (III); U.N. Doc. A/8 10, at 71. "Many governments
have taken the position that the Declaration of Human Rights defines human
rights and fundamental freedoms which members of the U.N. are legally obligated to respect; and some Assembly resolutions clearly accept this point of
view." L. Goodrich, E. Hambro & A. Simons, Charter of the United Nations
378 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Goodrich].
"See, for example, G.A. Res.
1663 (XVI), Nov. 28, 1961, on the question of race conflict in South Africa
in which the Assembly reaffirms 'that the racial policies being pursued by the
Government of South Africa are a flagrant violation of the U.N. Charter and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and are totally inconsistent with
South Africa's obligations as a Member State:" Id. at 378 n. 42.
127. 78 U.N.T.S. 277. Under Article VIII, "[a] ny Contracting Party
may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action
under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the
prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III." Consistent with this is the language in Article IV, which
states that "[p] ersons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated
in Article III shall be punished...." Id. Thus, the clear purpose of Article
III, prescribing retribution for those who commit genocide, is complemented
by an implied right of intervention to prevent acts of genocide, as suggested
in Article VIII.
128. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 16 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) 52, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966).
129. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 16 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) 49, U.N.
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In addition to the Article 2(4) bar of humanitarian intervention,
it is suggested that Article 2(7) of the Charter forbids even U.N.authorized military forces to "intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." 1 3 0 Therefore,
they would be proscribed from interfering in order to prevent
genocide.
Yet Article 2(7) is not an absolute bar to the use of force
by the U.N. in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of a state, since the article is qualified by the phrase
"essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" and the clause "but
this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII." 1 3 1
Moreover, "it can no longer
be argued that violations of human rights 'which shock the conscience of mankind' are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of states." 1 3 2 Governments which are responsible through their
own acts or omissions for mass murders within their borders are
unlikely to keep such killings a domestic affair. 1 3 3 Further, to
argue that genocidal acts of a government within its borders are
within its domestic jurisdiction is to legitimize such acts and deem
them worthy of protection by the international community. This
is inconsistent with the Charter and the subsequent international
conventions and General Assembly resolutions that declare that
13 4
protection of human rights is a necessary element of peace.
1
35
For this reason, genocide is not a protected act.
Genocide is
not an "internal affair" of a state but an illegitimate act under
13 6
the Genocide Convention and customary international law.
Doc. A/6316 (1966).
130. U.N. Charter, Art. 2, para. 7.
131. Id.
132. Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations vii (R. Lillich
ed. 1973).
133. McDougal and Reisman, Rhodesia and the U.N.: The Lawfulness
of InternationalConcern, 62 Am.J. Int'l L. 1,13 (1968) (hereinafter cited as
McDougal and Reisman]. "It has been too often confirmed that practices of
indignity and strife which begin as internal in physical manifestation in a single
community quickly and easily spread to the other communities and become
international." Id.
134. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, preamble, para.
1, G.A. Res. 217A (Ill), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
135. See note 127 supra.
136. "It is important to note that the Nuremburg Tribunal applied both
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Similarly, no one would argue that an armed attack against another
state is protected as an external affair of a state, as the word
"affairs" refers only to acts that are in conformity with international
law. In addition, the seemingly absolute proscription of the use of
against another is qualified in the same article
force by one state
13 7
and paragraph.
A less severe situation arose in this context with respect to
the recent declaration of independence of Rhodesia. The U.N.
dealt with the situation under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, which
provides that the Security Council "shall determine the existence
of any threat to the peace . . . and shall make recommendations,
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles
41 and 42. ' 138 Even though such a determination has been rare,
the Security Council found both the unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesia and its policies of apartheid to constitute
a "threat to the peace," and verbally condemned them.
The promulgation and application of policies
of racism in a context as volatile as that of
Rhodesia and South Africa must give rise to
expectations of violence and constitute, if
not aggression of the classical type, at least
the creation of circumstances under which
states have been customarily regarded as justistratefied in unilaterally resorting to coercive
13 9
gies of humanitarian intervention.
By the same reasoning it follows that if apartheid policies are a
threat to the peace, genocide in Cambodia must also be, thereby
creating an opportunity for the use of humanitarian intervention.
If the Security Council is unable to act, then the "secondary
powers" of the General Assembly come into operation. Failure
by the General Assembly to act gives regional organizations jurisdiction to maintain the peace so long as "their activities are conthe London Charter and customary international law to the defendants before
it. (citations omitted). Hence the explicit language of Art. I of the Genocide
Convention: lThe Contracting Parties confirm that genocide . . . is a crime
under international law. . . .' Reisman, supra note 109, at 174.
137. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 25) 121,
U.N. Doc. A18028 (1970).
138. U.N. Charter, Art. 39 (emphasis added).
139. McDougal and Reisman, supra note 133, at 13.
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14 0
sistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."
The U.N. Charter creates a separate form of state action for human
rights deprivations when the Security Council, the General Assembly,
and regional organizations fail to act to halt egregious human rights
deprivations. "Article 55 of the Charter reaffirms that the U.N.
shall promote universal respect for, and observance of human rights

and fundamental freedoms for all. .

.

. Article 56 transforms that

commitment into an active obligation for joint and separate action
in defense of human rights." 14
The recognition of such a right
is essential, since the U.N. cannot be expected to intervene actively
14 2
through the use of force except in the most limited circumstances.
Opponents of humanitarian intervention assert that strong
policy. arguments militate against the resurrection of the doctrine,
in that humanitarian intervention will be used as a legal smokescreen
for naked agression. This argument is not persuasive. If a nation
desires to appear to comply with the rule, or if it wants to put forth
an unreasonable interpretation of the rule, it will do so. If a state
wishes to present a legal justification for an invasion, Article 14513
of the U.N. Charter, the self-defense provision, is available.

140. Reisman, supra note 109, at 192.
141. McDougal and Reisman, Response by McDougal and Reisman,
3 Intl L. 438, 444 (1968-69). Franck and Rodley reply to McDougal and
Reisman by stating that "individual action" referred to in Articles 55 and
56 "clearly means self-enforcement by those who adhere to the instrument,
not enforcement by states against one another." Franck, supra note 83, at
277. Moreover, they write that "in only one instrument is the door to humanitarian intervention left ajar. The Proclamation of Teheran states regarding
the crime of apartheid that it 'is imperative for the international community
to use every possible means to eradicate this evil." Id. at 299 n. 110. It is
beyond cavil that if the door is open for the eradication of apartheid, it is open
for the prevention of genocide.
142. See Reisman, supra note 109 at 195.
143. U.N. Charter, Art. 51. The Soviet Union's intervention in Czechoslovakia is an example. The Soviet Government stated that the Czech Government had asked for assistance in quelling the 1968 riots; however, this was a
fabrication. Around the time of the invasion, "one of the jokes making the
rounds was, 'What are 500,000 Soviet troops doing in Czechoslovakia? . . .
Looking for the person who invited them in!"' Conference ProceedingsPart
II: The Present. Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations 100 (R.
Lillich ed. 1973). The Soviets made another spurious claim in Hungary. J.
Michener, The Bridge at Andau 145 (1957).
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It is also claimed that reviving the doctrine will increase the
likelihood that the superpowers will go to loggerheads, triggering
a nuclear confrontation. The behavior of the superpowers since
World War II, however, suggests that it is unlikely that military
action would occur under cover of humanitarian intervention without consideration of national and international consequences.
When the United States intervened in the Dominican Republic
and in Lebanon, and the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia and
Hungary, there was no counter-intervention by the other superpower. In the Vietnam conflict, the Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China did not introduce their own forces into the war,
though they supplied arms to the VC/NVA. More recently, the
even minimal help
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has not brought
14
from the United States to the Afghan rebels.
Notwithstanding the arguments about the U.N. Charter and
a comparison between the India-Pakistan conflict and the CambodiaVietnam war,
The Bengali [or Cambodian] villager who has
just seen his family slaughtered . . . doesn't

give a damn about what happened in the nineteenth century, and he doesn't give a God damn
about what happened in the eighteenth century
[or about the meaning of Articles 2(4) and 2(7)
of the U.N. Charter]. He looks to the rest of
the world, he looks to the rest of his species,
who are alive now, to do something, to intervene on his behalf. 1 4 5
Not only the Cambodians, but the Ugandans, Laotians, and others
have a right to live. Their concern is not that the end justifies
the means; that there should be no intervention to halt genocide
because action might jeopardize world peace.
The practice of non-intervention to preserve world peace
violates the most fundamental precept of natural law. 14 6 Worse
yet, it is indistinguishable from Pol Pot's behavior. The world
condemned Pol Pot for his inhuman methods of bringing about
his Khmer revolution, but found a similar analysis on the inter-

144. New York Times, Oct. 1, 1980, at 27, col. 1.
145. Conference Proceedings Part II: The Present, Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations 18 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
146. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law 190 (1960).
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national level quite palatable. The result of such an international
attitude can only be a ratification of the carnage in which each
state is responsible. The purpose of the framers of the U.N. Charter
was to avoid such a violation.
The Vietnamese, whatever their motives, have all but eliminated the remains of the Khmer Rouge policies in Cambodia and
have put the beleaguered nation on the road to recovery. It is
the responsibility of the United Nations and the world to assure
that the Vietnamese will leave Cambodia.
This will not happen until the United States changes its policy
toward Cambodia. The United States continues to recognize the
Pol Pot government in the U.N., 14 7 even though President Carter,
who boasts of his concern for the human rights of all, 14 8 denounced
14 9
Cambodia as the worst violator of human rights in the world.
Only when the new government is recognized-even if only for the
present-and accommodations are made with the Vietnamese will
Cambodia be able to begin its long journey toward recovery.
James Lutfy

147. Time, Nov. 12, 1979, at 50.
148. New York Times,June 18, 1980, at 31, col. 1.
149. Reader's Digest Almanac and Yearbook 518 (1979).

